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abstract: A common argument in support of a beginning of the universe used 
by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) is the argument against 
the possibility of an actual infinite, or the “Infinity Argument”. However, it turns 
out that the Infinity Argument loses some of its force when compared with the 
achievements of set theory and it brings into question the view that God prede-
termined an endless future. We therefore defend a new formal argument, based on 
the nature of time (just as geometrical reasoning is based on the nature of space), 
which addresses more directly the question of beginningless time.
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I
In philosophy, the question whether a beginningless time is possible 
has received increased attention because of the role it plays in the kalām 
cosmological argument and because of some empirical and mathema-
tical results in cosmology.1 The kalām cosmological argument (KCA) is 
1 We do not mean only the prevalent Big Bang cosmology based on redshift observations 
but also results like singularity theorems (e.g. Penrose 1965) or the so-called BGV theorem 
(Borde, Guth and Vilenkin 2003).
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a notable theistic argument that tries to prove three claims, namely, (i) 
that the universe came into being, (ii) that the universe, therefore, has 
a cause or external reason for its existence, and (iii) that this cause or 
reason is grounded in a transcendent, personal being (or God). A part of 
the KCA may, thus, be presented as the following syllogism (see Craig 
1999: 737):
1. Whatever comes into being has an external reason for its existence.
2. The universe came into being.
3. Therefore, the universe has an external reason for its existence.
The phrase “the universe came into being” in premise 2 is to be under-
stood as “the time of the universe had a beginning.” A distinguishing 
characteristic of the KCA is that it makes use of the notion of infinity 
to show that the universe had a beginning. A common argument in 
support of a beginning of the universe used by advocates of the KCA 
is the argument against the metaphysical possibility of an actual infi-
nite. Let us refer to this as the “Infinity Argument”.2 According to the 
Infinity Argument, if the universe had no beginning, then an actually 
infinite number of past events (such as days) have occurred. However, 
it is metaphysically impossible for an infinite number of things (such 
as events) either to exist (i.e. be instantiated in the real world) simulta-
neously or to come into existence in such a way that there is a time at 
which all the infinitely many things have already occurred. Thus, since 
an infinite sequence of events cannot be completed, the sequence of past 
events must be finite. It follows, then, that the universe had a beginning.
Our intention in this paper is twofold. Firstly, we show that the Infi-
nity Argument is problematic because (i) set theory is consistent with the 
existence of an actual infinite and (ii) the Infinity Argument brings into 
question the view that God predetermined an endless future. We do not 
intend to argue that the Infinity Argument is unsound but, rather, that 
it faces problems that render it inconclusive. We then, secondly, defend 
a new formal argument against beginningless time that is compatible 
with the possibility of both an actual infinite and an endless future. 
More precisely, we argue that, under certain common-sense assumpti-
2 The Infinity Argument is not the only philosophical argument for a cosmic beginning 
offered by the proponents of the KCA. Other arguments include the argument from the 
impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition (Craig and Sinclair 
2012: 117-125), the argument based on traversing infinite time (Erasmus 2018: 114-117), the 
so-called Grim Reaper Paradox (Koons 2014), and Alexander R. Pruss’ (2018) arguments for 
causal finitism. The latter two arguments are similar to the argument we present below.
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ons concerning the nature of time, the notion of beginningless time is 
inconsistent. We will begin by briefly describing the Infinity Argument.
II
As mentioned above, the Infinity Argument attempts to show that the 
universe had a beginning because an actual infinite cannot exist and 
beginningless time entails an actual infinite. Accordingly, we may for-
mulate the Infinity Argument as follows (Craig and Sinclair 2012: 103):3
(A1) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(A2) A beginningless sequence of events is an actual infinite.
(A3) Therefore, a beginningless sequence of events cannot exist.
In order to understand this argument better, we must distinguish betwe-
en the actual infinite and the potential infinite. The actual infinite is an 
endless set whose members, nevertheless, exist all at once or at least 
are such that there is a time at which all of them have already existed. 
Thus, the actual infinite is a completed totality of infinitely many dis-
tinct members. On the other hand, the potential infinite is an indefinite 
process, such as endless addition. Such a process or sequence is dynamic 
because it increases endlessly towards infinity but at no point does it 
become actually infinite. Thus, the potential infinite is always finite and 
never complete. The crucial difference, then, between the actual infinite 
and the potential infinite is that the latter is not a completed totality 
whereas the former is.
In defense of (A1), many proponents of the KCA use the Hilbert’s 
Hotel thought experiment to show that certain alleged absurdities wo-
uld result if an actual infinite were metaphysically possible (Craig and 
Sinclair 2012: 108-110): Imagine a hotel with an infinite number of 
rooms, with each room being occupied by a guest. Now, suppose that the 
guest in room number 1 departs and, thus, the room becomes available. 
Oddly enough, however, although there is one less guest in the hotel, 
the number of guests in the hotel has not changed and remains infinite. 
Thus, infinity minus one equals infinity. Now, suppose that each guest 
in an odd numbered room departs. In that case, although an infinite 
3 The Infinity Argument dates back to John Philoponus (AD c. 490-c. 570) in the fifth 
century, and the argument was also refined and defended by numerous Muslim philosophers in 
the Middle Ages (see Erasmus 2018: 41-64). Hence, there are various versions of the Infinity 
Argument. Nevertheless, for simplicity, we will briefly focus on the Infinity Argument offered 
by William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair (2012).
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number of guests have left, the number of guests in the hotel remains 
the same, namely, infinity. Consequently, infinity minus infinity equals 
infinity. However, if all the guests in room numbers 5 and above depart, 
then only four guests would remain – those in room numbers 1, 2, 3 
and 4. Thus, infinity minus infinity equals four. This, in turn, apparently 
leads to three inconsistent situations:
1. Infinity minus one equals infinity (ℵ0 - 1 = ℵ0)
2. Infinity minus infinity equals infinity (ℵ0 - ℵ0 = ℵ0)
3. Infinity minus infinity equals four (ℵ0 - ℵ0 = 4)
Thus, the Hilbert’s Hotel thought experiment apparently illustrates that, 
if an actually infinite number of objects can exist in the real world, then 
an equal quantity may be subtracted from an equal quantity and yet 
produce different results. However, according to the proponents of the 
Infinity Argument, such a situation is impossible and, thus, an actual 
infinite cannot exist. Furthermore, as William Lane Craig and James 
Sinclair (2012: 115) note, (A2) seems obviously true because “if there 
has been a sequence composed of an infinite number of events stretching 
back into the past, then the set of all events in the series would be an 
actually infinite set.” Accordingly, the Infinity Argument concludes that 
an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist and, thus, the universe 
had a beginning.
III
Although the Infinity Argument is not necessarily unsound, we believe 
it faces difficulties. In the first place, finite sets behave very differently 
to infinite sets. Unlike with finite sets, subtraction with infinite sets is 
not well defined and, thus, it leads to different answers based on which 
members of the set are “subtracted” or taken away. However, this is not 
a logical contradiction. As James East argues:
If actual infinite collections were to exist, then they would naturally have proper-
ties that were not shared by finite collections… The story of Hilbert’s Hotel simply 
highlights … such [a] property that distinguishes actual infinite collections from 
finite ones: just knowing that an infinite subcollection has been removed from an 
infinite collection of objects does not allow one to determine how many objects 
remain. But this property itself does not entail that actual infinite collections 
are impossible. (East 2013: 433)
Thus, set theory is compatible with the existence of an actual infinite. 
For this reason, the Infinity Argument depends, not on pure logical or 
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mathematical modality, but on our intuitions about what is metaphysi-
cally possible and impossible. However, as Craig and Sinclair (2012: 106) 
acknowledge, “[a]rguments for metaphysical […] impossibility typically 
rely upon intuitions and conceivability arguments, which are obviously 
much less certain guides than strict logical consistency or inconsistency.” 
Therefore, the Infinity Argument will not convince those who do not 
share the metaphysical intuitions of its proponents.
Secondly, the Infinity Argument brings into question the view that 
God predetermined an endless future. The problem is that the propo-
nents of the KCA are inclined to believe that God can predetermine 
an endless sequence of events but it appears that, if God did so, an 
actual infinite would exist (namely, the set of all future truths), either 
as a self-subsisting abstract object4 or as a content of God’s mind (see 
Morriston 2010). Craig’s solution to this problem is that abstract objects 
do not exist and that God’s knowledge is non-propositional in nature 
because God has a simple, undivided intuition of all reality and, thus, 
God does not know an actually infinite number of propositions (Craig 
and Smith 1993: 94-96). Jacobus Erasmus and Anné H. Verhoef (2015: 
411-427) offer a different solution, namely, that God can actualize an 
endless future without consciously thinking about each future event in 
it. However, both these solutions depend on controversial metaphysical 
positions, since the former requires the rejection of Platonism5 and 
the latter defends an unusual account of omniscience. Therefore, these 
solutions can hardly be said to completely solve the problem posed by 
the predetermined future objection. 
In light of these problems, we believe the Infinity Argument is 
inconclusive. Nevertheless, since the KCA tries to show that an actually 
infinite sequence of past events is impossible, it is unnecessary for the 
KCA to deny the possibility of any actual infinite whatsoever. Therefore, 
we suggest that the advocates of the KCA would profit from supplemen-
4 Abstract objects are generally said to be those objects that are not persons and are non-
spatial, non-temporal, non-physical, and causally inert. However, regardless of how one should 
define abstract objects, we are merely presupposing that propositions, truths, and mathematical 
objects (such as sets and numbers) are abstract objects.
5 Of course, the proponent of the Infinity Argument that already denies Platonism might 
not view this as a problem. However, if the proponent is a Platonist, then this would be a problem 
for him. Likewise, if Platonists claim to have very powerful arguments in favour of Platonism, 
then the proponent of the Infinity Argument would have to take on the difficult task of refuting 
Platonism in order to defend the Infinity Argument. 
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ting the Infinity Argument with an argument that denies the possibility 
of beginningless time only. We will now propose one such argument 
inspired by Laureano Luna (2009a, 2014).
IV
Let us begin by offering an informal version of our philosophical argu-
ment for a beginning of the universe. We shall offer a thought experiment, 
which we shall call the “gong peal paradox”, to illustrate the impossible 
situation that could result from beginningless time. This paradox is based 
on Luna’s (2009a: 304) gong peal paradox, which is based on José A. 
Benardete’s (1964: 259) gong peal thought experiment. The paradox is 
as follows. Imagine that the universe is beginning-less and past eternal 
(i.e. past time is infinite). Imagine further that Smith, who is immortal 
and has been around for the entire past, rings a peal once every day. 
Since Smith has always been around, he has always been doing this. 
Furthermore, imagine that the following proposition is true:
(B) The peal is so loud that Smith would be struck deaf permanently 
upon hearing the peal iff he was not previously deafened by the 
peal.
(B) entails that Smith can be deaf only as a consequence of hearing the 
peal. Now, for any past day x, Smith must already have been deaf prior 
to ringing the gong peal on x. The reason for this is that Smith’s act of 
ringing the peal on the day immediately prior to x ensures that Smith 
would be deaf on x. Hence, Smith has been deaf throughout the entire 
past. But if Smith were deaf before he rings the peal on any past day, then 
there is no day on which he became deaf by hearing the peal. However, 
Smith can become deaf only by hearing the peal. Consequently, we are 
led to the following inconsistent states:
1. Smith can be deaf only as a consequence of hearing the peal.
2. Smith has never heard the peal.
3. Smith is deaf.
Since these three states are inconsistent, the entire situation is logically 
impossible. Intuitively, one may see that this entire situation was pro-
duced by the beginningless-ness of the temporal regress of past events. 
If time had a beginning, then the contradiction would vanish because 
Smith would become deaf on the first day.
J. ERASMUS / L. LUNA: A philosophical argument for the beginning of time 167
One might object that the paradox does not result if time is be-
ginningless and Smith rings the peal on a finite number of days only. In 
other words, one may argue that it is, in fact, the following two incom-
patible states that result in the impossible situation above:
(i) Time is beginningless.
(ii) For every day in time, Smith rings a peal that is so loud that 
Smith is struck deaf permanently upon hearing the peal iff Smith 
was not previously deafened by the peal.
Hence, the objection is that one may affirm (i) while denying the pos-
sibility of (ii) given (i) (note that this does not mean that (ii) is impos-
sible if (i) is true but, rather, that (ii) is false in all possible worlds in 
which (i) is true). The problem with this objection, however, is that (ii) 
is obviously possible if time is finite and, therefore, if (i) is true in some 
possible worlds, then something must prevent (ii) from being true in all 
those possible worlds. But what could this something be? Stephen Yablo 
(2000) voices an unusual criticism of Benardete’s God-wall paradox 
(Benardete 1964: 259–260), which is similar to the gong peal paradox. 
According to Yablo, denying an infinite regress is not the only solution 
to these Benardete-type paradoxes. Another way out of these paradoxes, 
claims Yablo, is to argue that logic prevents one of the seemingly possible 
situations in the thought experiment from happening. Adapted for the 
gong peal paradox, Yablo’s solution is that logic renders (ii) impossible 
when (i) is true. In other words, if time is beginningless, then, although 
Smith intends to ring the peal every day at noon, logic prevents him 
from doing this an actually infinite number of times; logic permits Smith 
to ring the peal a finite number of times only, thereby causing Smith to 
become deaf by hearing the peal during his first ring.
Unfortunately, Yablo’s solution seems to treat logic as a causal force. 
However, as Luna (2009b: 95) points out, logic is not a causal force that 
could step in and stop Smith from ringing the peal on certain days. 
Indeed, if logic could stop Smith from ringing the peal, on which days 
would it stop him? There is simply no logical necessity that Smith cannot 
ring the peal on certain days in all worlds in which (i) is true. Yablo’s 
proposal is more a re-statement in other words of the already known 
impossibility than an explanation thereof.
Thus, there is no reason to think that something would render (ii) 
false in all possible worlds in which (i) is true. Therefore, the impossi-
bility of the conjunction of (i) and (ii) does not seem to come from 
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mere incompatibility between those propositions but from an intrinsic 
impossibility of (i).
It is helpful to note that the preceding argument is akin to the usual 
intuitive argument against the possibility of time travel: if one could go 
backward in time, what would prevent one of impeding one’s own birth 
by killing one’s own grandfather before he met one’s own grandmother? 
What is obviously impossible is the following conjunction: “one can 
both travel backward in time and kill one’s grandfather, so as to make 
one’s own birth impossible.” However, since nothing seems to be able 
to prevent the latter given the former, one is inclined to believe that the 
former is impossible on its own.
We are not claiming that the preceding argument is logically com-
pelling. Instead, the argument is simply a heuristic device used to convey 
the intuition that ungroundedness in causal chains is not just counter-
intuitive, as traditionally believed, but also inconsistent if aptly tweaked. 
If one compares the famous Russell set of all non self-membered sets 
with the set of all self-membered sets, or the Liar with the Truth-Teller, 
one sees that they turn indeterminateness due to ungroundedness into 
contradiction.6 Benardete’s and Yablo’s paradoxes seem to play a similar 
role as regards ungrounded temporal chains. Yablo’s paradox (Yablo 1993) 
is as follows: let S = s1 , s2 , s3 … be an infinite sequence of sentences such 
that for all n,
sn = “∀m>n [sm is untrue]”.
Therefore, for each n, sn is true iff none of the following sentences in S is. 
Suppose some sn is true; then for all m > n, sm is untrue; hence for all p > 
n + 1, sp is untrue, which renders sn+1 true, hence sn false; contradiction; 
as sn was arbitrary, all members of S are false but then for all m > n, sm 
is untrue, which makes sn true; contradiction again. This is the paradox. 
Suppose now each sn was stated at time tn and reverse the order of the 
members of S from s1 , s2 , s3 … to … s3 , s2 , s1 so that tn+1 immediately 
precedes tn; then you get a structural analogue to Benardete’s paradox 
(as shown in Shackel 2005).
We will now present a more formal argument. Surely, the intuition 
behind the claim that (ii) has to be valid as an effective rule to determine 
6 Let S be the set of all self-membered sets; we have that S ∈ S ↔ S ∈ S, which leaves the 
issue indeterminate; however, for Russell’s R: R ∈ R ↔ R ∉ R, which is a contradiction. Consider 
the Truth-Teller sentence: “this sentence is true”: it is true iff it is true, and we have no other 
criterion to determine its truth value. Consider the (Strengthened) Liar sentence “this sentence 
is not true”: it is true iff it is not true.
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Smith’s deafness is that the past is determinate to the effect of deter-
mining its future. This seems to follow from the irreversibility of time. 
Now, if we exploit the irreversibility of time and the determinateness of 
the past as essential features of time, we can prove theorems about time 
just as we can prove theorems about space based on its essential traits. 
This permits to offer a more rigorous version of the preceding argument 
in the next section: we will rely on the determinateness of the past and 




i. By a strict chain we understand a pair S = (Q, <), where Q is a set with 
at least two members and < is a strict total order on Q.
The order among the members of Q can be expressed by supplying its 
members qi with indices from a subset I from the adequate set of numbers 
(natural, integer, real numbers…). Let qB be the <-first member of Q, if 
it exists (we can take the index B to be always 0; however, q0 ≠ qB if the 
chain has no <-first member).
ii. A chain is ungrounded iff
∀i ∈ I ∃j ∈ I [qj < qi].
remarks on definition 1
Chains are usually defined as totally ordered subsets of partially ordered 
sets: strictness is usually not included. However, for brevity, we will omit 
the adjective “strict” from now on.
If we wish to concern ourselves with causal-temporal chains of events, 
time can provide the ordering <T , interpreted as a relation of temporal 
precedence.
definition 2
Let S = (Q, <) be a chain. A recursive determination rule D on S is a rule 
that determines the state of the items in Q (except qB, if it exists) on the 
basis of the states of <-prior items in Q. More precisely, let Σ be the set 
of all states of the members of Q and, for any i ∈ I, let σi be the state of 
qi . D is a recursive determination rule iff, when represented as a function 
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D : 2Σ → Σ (where 2Σ is the power set of Σ ), it is such that
∀i ∈ I / {B } [∃X ≠ ∅ [X ⊆ Σ & ∀j ∈ I [σj ∈ X → qj < qi ] & σi = D (X )]].
As advanced, this means that each state, except the initial one if it exists, 
is determined by D on the basis of some nonempty set of previous states. 
If we define Xi as follows: for any i ∈ I , let 
Xi = {σj ∈ Σ | qj <T qi },
then a special form of recursive determination rule is the rule DXi in 
which Xi is never empty and
∀i ∈ I [σi = DXi (Xi )],
and any such DXi is a recursive determination rule, since it determines 
each σi based on all σj preceding σi .
definition 3
Time is normal iff the content of the past is determinate to the effect 
of determining on its basis the content of subsequent time units. This 
can also be more formally defined as follows. Let T = (QT , <T ); let DT 
be a well-defined (i.e. univocal, that is to say. able to be represented as a 
function, as D in Definition 2) recursive determination rule on T; T is 
normal iff any DT is able to determine σi for each i ∈ I, except B (if B ∈ I ).
lemma 1
If time is beginningless, then a well-defined recursive determination rule 
exists that fails to make σi definite for each i ∈ I.
proof
Let T = (QT , <T ) be a beginningless chain of time intervals. We define a 
recursive rule LR on T. LR is inspired by Benardete’s gong peal paradox 
(Benardete 1964: 259) and Yablo’s Infinite Liars paradox. According to 
LR , the state of any member of QT is 1 if no state of a previous member 
is 1; otherwise, it is 0:
(LR)  ∀i ∈ I [σi = 1 ↔ ∀j ∈ I [qj <T qi → σj ≠ 1]].
Note that LR has the same form as rule B in the gong peal paradox: 
for any day, there is something that occurs on that day iff it has never 
occurred on any previous day. Note also that LR is both unambiguously 
defined and a recursive determination rule, since (letting for simplicity 
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“LR” denote the corresponding function)7 for any i ∈ I: 
σi = LR (Xi ).
We can show by purely logical means that LR is inconsistent for T. Here 
is the sketch of a derivation:
1.  ∃i ∈ I [σi = 1]   Assumption
2. σk = 1    1,
3. ∀j ∈ I [qj <T qk → σj ≠ 1] 2, LR
4. ∀j ∈ I [qj <T qk-1 → σj ≠ 1] 3
5. σk-1 = 1    4, LR
6. ∃j ∈ I [qj <T qk  & σj = 1] 5
7. σk ≠ 1    6, LR
8. ∄i ∈ I [σi = 1]   Contradiction between 2 and 7
9. ∀i ∈ I [σi ≠ 1]   8
10. ∀i, j ∈ I [qj <T qi → σj ≠ 1] 9
11. ∀i ∈ I [σi = 1]   10, LR
12. ∃i ∈ I [σi = 1]   11
Note the contradiction between 8 and 12.
note on lemma 1
Trivially, if qB ∈ QT , then by LR, σB = 1 and 
∀i ∈ I [B <T i → σi = 0],
which renders LR successful in providing states for all members of QT : 
inconsistency vanishes as soon as the chain is grounded and an infinite 
regress is impossible.
theorem 1
If time is normal, then it is not beginningless.
proof
There is a contradiction between definition 1 of normality of time, accor-
ding to which each well-defined recursive determination rule succeeds 
in determining states for the items of QT, and Lemma 1.
7 The definition of LR as a function would be: ∀i ∈ I [LR (Xi) = 1 if ∀x ∈ Xi [x ≠ 1], and 
LR (Xi) = 0, otherwise].
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determinateness of the past and normality of time
If we assume that a temporal chain is both beginningless and normal, 
we can prove that at least the recursive determination rule LR governing 
the chain both succeeds and fails, which is the fundament of Theorem 
1. It fails because it deals with an ungrounded chain and falls into an 
infinite regress. It succeeds because time is normal. But do we really need 
normality of time to show it cannot fail or can the determinateness of 
the past do the job? Indeed, how could the recursive rule not succeed if 
it is only determining items in a well-defined way on the basis of already 
determinate items?
Time, in our intuitive conception, is normal. This intuition relies 
on the conviction that what has already occurred is determinate and 
unchangeable: no influence goes backwards in time; time is, in this sense, 
irreversible. Stating that time is irreversible is stating that the past cannot 
be altered from its future, that is, that the past is irreversibly determinate. 
So far, we have a formal proof that normal time is not beginningless 
and a strong intuition that the past is irreversibly determinate. We need 
an argument to the effect that if the past is irreversibly determinate, as in-
tuition suggests, then it is normal and then, as our Theorem 1 shows, it has a 
beginning. This we provide in the following paragraphs.
Consider the following question: how could an absolutely univocal 
instruction returning just one output for each input fail to determine an 
output? Intuitively, this can only occur in case the input is not determi-
nate. And one can easily imagine how this could be the case in temporal 
causal chains; imagine an instruction determining the content of time t 
in terms of its future; as the future of t may depend causally on t, it may 
fail to be determinate to the effect of determining the content of t: the 
instruction may lead to a vicious circle or a loop. But precisely this is 
what cannot be the case for recursive determination rules in temporal 
chains if the past is irreversibly determinate. If the past is so determinate, 
the input of a rule like LR is always determinate.
Or consider an agent A, omniscient as regards everything determi-
nate and lying in the past, located at the beginning of time unit t and 
trying to determine the content of t according to rule LR. How could 
A fail? As LR is absolutely well-defined and univocal, A will be able to 
decide the content of t as soon as he knows the content of the past of t; 
as A knows every bit of the past (unless it is indeterminate), A can only 
fail if the past of t is indeterminate. Thus, if the past is determinate for 
any t, A can never fail. If A can never fail to determine t on the basis of 
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a recursive determination rule, then no such rule can fail and time is 
surely normal.
As no loop or any other cause of indeterminateness can arise in a 
recursive determination rule for a temporal chain if the past is irreversibly 
determinate, everything works as if the irreversible determinateness of 
the past grounded the rule so as to prevent it from failing. This is why 
we have that for a beginningless time, if the past is always irreversibly 
determinate, LR must both fail and succeed.
Thus, it seems that, on the intuitive condition that the past is irre-
versibly determinate, time has to be normal; and if so, by Theorem 1, it 
must have a beginning. This completes our main argument.8
Consider, furthermore, that it is hard to see how causal laws could 
work if time were not normal, so that past events were not determinate 
to the effect of determining upcoming events. The fact that causal laws 
exist and work provides a direct intuition that time is normal. Thus, 
we believe that the result that normal time cannot be beginningless is 
itself a strong result because time seems very likely to be normal in the 
sense defined.
Normality is a condition of time as we conceive it that can be used to 
establish some facts about it, in the same way as the properties of space 
permit to prove geometrical theorems. For instance, it can be shown that 
the notion of beginningless normal time is inconsistent.
Appendix. Replies to possible objections
This article has a history of objections by colleagues that range from subtle 
to weird. This is why we have deemed it convenient to add this appendix.
Objection 1. “Smith could suffer from eternity from permanently deafen-
ing otitis.”
In response we note that this objection fails to appreciate the nature of 
a thought experiment. A thought experiment is an imaginary scenario 
that is used to test which of a few supposedly possible propositions are, 
in fact, possible. The “possibility” in mind is not merely a practical pos-
sibility, but a logical or metaphysical possibility. Thus, the critic cannot 
simply assert that the thought experiment is too far-fetched but he 
or she must also show that (ii) is logically impossible. In other words, 
8 Note that determinism in the sense of causal determinism is nowhere invoked in the 
argument.
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objecting to (ii) is like objecting to the definition of a newly introduced 
object: it makes sense only if the stipulation is contradictory; but surely 
logic doesn’t require in the above scenario the presence of something 
other than the gong peal to deafen Smith.
Objection 2. “One can only ask of irreversible time to be determinable 
by any recursive rule that is not contradictory the way we have shown 
LR to be.”
This objection can be given the following two replies: (a) The point 
is that if the past is irreversibly determinate, it is unintelligible how a 
rule (whatever it is) could fail to determine one item if it univocally 
prescribes its content based only on the content of preceding items, 
i.e. on the content of the past. The objection is irrelevant to this point. 
(b) Note that our point could be made using the rule “any item is the 
same as the immediately preceding one” (call it LP) instead of LR. The 
sole advantage of LR over LP is that it can be logically proven by reductio 
to fail to determine any item whereas showing the same for LP is just 
showing that it is compatible with more than one situation: all days are 
0, all days are 1. Nothing, however, is as trenchant as a contradiction. 
However, the reader can forget about LR and use LP instead, which is 
by no means contradictory.
Objection 3. “An irreversibly determinate past only guarantees an effective 
determination capacity for a recursive rule if the past is independently 
given for the application of the rule, that is, if it is not given through 
the rule itself; otherwise, the situation could be circular whatever the 
nature of the past.”
The objection is unjustified because, as we explain in the paper, if the 
agent who is to apply the recursive rule is relying in each occasion only 
on an irreversibly determinate past, the rule cannot fail in any occasion; 
the point is that the irreversibility of time has to ground the rule. If there 
are circumstances (as absence of a first time unit) under which a univocal 
recursive rule finds the past unavailable as a ground for the determination 
of the future, then, on the assumption that time is irreversible, those 
circumstances are ontologically impossible, for they are in contradiction 
with the inherent nature of time. And such is in essence our argument.
Objection 4. “There are ungrounded recursive rules that succeed even if 
time is beginningless. For instance, this expression determines a unique 
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content for each day:
(1)   ∀t [f (t) ∈ Z+ & f (t) = f (t - 1)2]
namely, ∀t [f (t) = 1].”
This objection attempts to refute the intuitive conjecture that the con-
tradiction arising from the combination of LR and beginningless time 
ultimately proceeds from the fact that ungrounded determination cha-
ins are unable to determine. Note, however, that as an instruction, (1) 
is useless to determine the value of any t because it leads to an infinite 
regress; we suggest that, for the purpose of representing the causal de-
pendence relation that obtains between the items in a causal-temporal 
chain, recursive rules should be interpreted as instructions to compute, 
in such a way that in the case of (1) one has to compute t - 1 in order 
to compute t; otherwise, the causal dependence relation gets lost in the 
mere mathematical formulation. Franzén has remarked the distinction 
between mere equations and computing instructions:
In general, however, it is not the case that the function computed by a set of 
equations […] read as an algorithm is the unique function satisfying those equa-
tions read as an assertion. Consider the following:
 (2)   G (x) = 2 if x = 0, and otherwise G (x) = G (x + 1) * (G (x + 1) + 1)
There is a unique total function satisfying (2), namely the function G for which 
G (n) = 0 for all n > 0, and G (0) = 2. However, the function computed by (2) 
read as an algorithm is undefined for all x > 0, since the attempt to compute G 
(x) by first computing G (x + 1) never terminates. (Franzen 2004: 154)
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